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Abstract
Purpose – Affordable homeownership is a policy that is often accorded a great deal of policy
attention by governments of many countries. This paper aims to examine the market implications of
setting a housing price to income ratio target for a market segment by the government.
Design/methodology/approach – The policy requires active intervention by the government with
regard to the targeted sector. The paper uses a simple model of the housing market with a
homeownership affordability target to derive the market implications of such targets.
Findings – In the presence of uncertainty and resource constraints, the objective of homeownership
affordability is achieved for the targeted group at the expense of greater volatility in residential
construction activity. When the size of the targeted sector is significant in size, there are spillover
price and crowding out effects on the non-targeted housing market segment.
Research limitations/implications – This results in political pressure on the government to
expand homeownership affordability targets to increasing segments of the population. Housing price
to income ratios tend to be fairly constant over time and across targeted groups, the housing supply is
relatively price inelastic and the income elasticity of housing demand is less than one.
Practical implications – The Singapore government intervenes extensively in the housing sector
to ensure homeownership affordability, with a resulting homeownership rate of 91 percent for the
resident population. The above hypotheses regarding the implications of setting housing price to
income ratio targets are tested using the Singapore housing market.
Originality/value – This paper adds to the literature by analyzing the market implications of
setting homeownership affordability targets in the context of a targeted housing segment.
Keywords Housing, Private ownership, Pricing policy, Market forces, Singapore
Paper type Research paper
Introduction: homeownership as policy objective
The promotion of homeownership is often accorded a great deal of policy attention
by governments of many countries. The benefits as well as the costs of home
ownership have been the subject of many studies. Atterhog (2005) classifies the
advantages as those relating to:
. the dwelling itself – ownership dwellings are typically larger and of higher
quality;
. accumulation of wealth as home ownership is often regarded as a long term
investment; and
. the non-tangible benefits many of which constitute positive externalities for
society and local community.
Coulson (2002) describes three aspects of positive externalities from ownership that
have been studied empirically. These include:
(1) better maintenance of property (Harding et al., 2000),
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1753-8270.htm
A previous version of this paper was presented at the June 2009 European Real Estate Society
Conference in Stockholm. The author is grateful to Kyung-Hwan Kim, two anonymous
reviewers and conference participants for helpful comments. Ziwei Shao provided excellent
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(2) being better citizens (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999) and
(3) children of owners having higher levels of cognition and fewer behavioral
problems (Haurin et al., 2002).
These positive attributes are by no means universal. A study by Quigley and Raphael
(2004) concludes that the evidence of externalities from homeownership is not
overwhelming.
With regard to negatives, homeownership is also associated with residential
immobility, differentiation and fragmentation, and is increasingly viewed as more risky
that in the past. Homeownership results in over-concentration of household investment
in one asset as well as exposes the household to uncertainty from housing price and
interest rate fluctuations (Atterhog, 2005). Moreover, the benefits and problems of low-
income homeownership differ from that of high-income homeownership. Shiller (2003)
advocated creating insurance on market values of individual homes; recently, market
initiatives to insure housing equity or hedge against price risk have been introduced in
the UK and the USA (Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magne, 2003; de Jong et al., 2007).
Not surprisingly, therefore, homeownership rates vary widely across countries as
well as regionally within a country. While Hungary, India, Mexico, Spain, Singapore,
Greece and Italy have rates of 80 percent or more, high-income countries such as
Germany and Switzerland have rates below 45 percent. UK, USA and Canada have
homeownership rates in the 65-69 percent range (Proxenos, 2002). Mass privatization of
the housing sector in UK, Eastern Europe and in China have also resulted in significant
increases in homeownership rates over a short period of time.
Recent studies that have tried to study the determinants of home ownership rates
internationally include Fisher and Jaffe (2003), Earley (2004), Gwin and Ong (2004) and
Atterhog (2005). Using multivariate analysis of macro-level data from 106 countries,
Fisher and Jaffe (2003) found that it was not possible to provide a single equation
model for homeownership variations globally. They concluded that legal, economic,
political and cultural institutions matter more as compared to income, ethnicity and
demographic variables. The study by Gwin and Ong (2004) provides international
evidence to support the theory that homeownership is sensitive to price of ownership
relative to rental costs, and postulated that higher ownership rates in some countries
could be attributed to government assistance programs and subsidies.
Chiuri and Jappelli (2002), using microeconomic data on 14 OECD countries, find
strong evidence that availability of mortgage finance (as measured by down payment
ratios) affects home ownership rates across age groups, especially at the younger end.
Proxenos (2002) however argues that homeownership rates alone are an incomplete
measure of the quality of a country’s housing finance system and emphasizes
the importance of government policy on homeownership. Earley (2004) categorizes the
various reasons for the wide variation in homeownership rates into factors on the
supply side, demand side, transactions costs, government policies and cultural issues
(p. 30). Atterhog (2005) surveyed housing researchers in 23 countries to collect
information on government support for homeownership and concluded that
‘‘government incentives maymatter for homeownership rates.’’
Government policies favoring homeownership as a tenure choice are widespread
and take various forms in different countries. These include mortgage interest
payments that are tax deductible, special treatment of capital gains from housing,
tenant protection laws that negatively impact the value of investment properties, mass
privatization, supply-side subsidies for state agencies and developers of housing for
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sale, mortgage interest subsidies, mandatory housing finance contributions, direct
grants for housing purchase, property tax subsidies, planning laws, limitations on the
supply of rental housing, etc.
In countries where homeownership is accorded policy attention, the affordability of
homeownership is likely to be closely tracked. In the next section, we review the literature
on homeownership affordability indicators. Then the market implications of setting a
homeownership affordability target for a market segment by the government are analyzed.
In the penultimate section, we use Singapore as a case study to test for the validity of the
hypotheses derived in the previous section. Conclusions are given in the final section.
Indicators of housing affordability
Bogdon and Can (1997) provide a review of indicators of rental affordability. The share
of income spent on housing or rental expenditure-to-income ratio is widely used, with
25-30 percent of income representing the upper limit of affordability (Hulchanski, 1995).
For the majority of households in countries with high homeownership rates as well
as for policy makers tracking homeownership affordability, housing affordability is
about homeownership affordability. Robinson et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive
review of the concepts and measurement of housing affordability. A variety of
organizations monitor homeownership affordability using the following indicators:
. house price to income ratio (UN-HABITAT, 2001);
. mortgage payment to household income ratio (US National Association of
Realtors, 2009); and
. ratio of median family income to the income required to qualify for a
conventional mortgage on the median valued house sold (US Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 2009).
Rather than using income-based ability to pay as a benchmark, Glaeser and Gyourko
(2003) advocate focusing on housing price relative to its fundamental costs of
production as a measure of housing affordability. Quigley and Raphael (2004) estimate
the user cost of housing capital, with and without capital gains, as an indicator of the
change in homeownership affordability over time. Krainer and Wei (2004) advocate
using the price-rent ratio as an indicator of market deviations from the fundamental
value of housing. Gwin and Ong (2004) find international variations in homeownership
rates to be highly sensitive to the price-to-rent ratio.
Each of the above measures of affordability has its benefits and limitations. The
most widely used and cited indicator of homeownership affordability is the median
house price to median income ratio, due to its simplicity and ease of understanding. Its
use is recommended by the World Bank and the United Nations; the ratio is available
on the UN-HABITAT database and it is also tracked for 265 metropolitan markets
in six countries by the Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey
(Performance Urban Planning, 2009). Its shortcomings include its failure to include
mortgage interest rates, banks’ lending practices such as loan to value ratios, capital
gains and amounts of taxes and repairs. No one measure of affordability is adequate on
it is own and Robinson et al. (2006) advocate using a basket of measures to obtain a
complete picture of affordability trends.
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Market implications of a house price to income ratio target
In this section, we examine the market implications of setting a homeownership
affordability target for a market segment by the government using a non-formal
theoretical framework. We then use the Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) formulation of the
housing market to study the implications for housing demand and supply elasticities.
Setting such a house price to income ratio would require the government to
intervene in the housing market to determine prices paid by households in the targeted
sector. Countries where forms of selective homeownership affordability targets and
policies exist include Norway, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea (Aarland and
Nordvik, 2009; Groves et al., 2007). These and European countries such as the Sweden
and the Netherlands (where the emphasis is more on affordable rental housing) have
housing allocation policies and levels of housing market intervention that contrast with
the market-oriented US housing model.
The literature on the market impact of housing policies is rather thin. As reviewed
in Nordvik (2006), the literature on how selective housing programs affect housing
market equilibrium outcomes include the analyzes of Malpezzi and Vandell (2002),
Sinai and Waldfogel (2005) and Murray (1983, 1999) for the USA, and Nordvik (1997,
2006) for Norway. This article contributes to the existing literature by considering the
market impacts of housing targets in an Asian context, and where the scale of
intervention is at a much higher level than in market-oriented housing models.
Consider a housing market in which the household in a targeted group is not
expected to pay more than x times the median household income for the median
dwelling in the targeted group. This policy may be achieved through supply side and/
or demand side policies. On the supply side, the government may choose to build or
subsidize the building of housing that is sold to the targeted group at a price that is
consistent with the price affordability target. It could also subsidize the household
through the use of housing grants the amount of which allows the household to
purchase a housing unit at a price net of grant subsidy that is consistent with the price
affordability target. Here, we analyze the market implications of supply side housing
programs.
Housing policy determines the desired ratio x*, the quality of the housing unit for
the targeted group, as well as maximum income measure as a cut-off point to exclude
higher income households from non-universal subsidized housing units (either an
absolute income figure or say y* percent of the area’s median income). In the short term
however, the actual x and y may differ from the target x* and y* due to policy lags and
unexpected income shocks. As discussed in Hulchanski (1995), housing affordability
measures and income cut-offs used for the purpose of defining housing need for public
policy purposes whether for rental or homeownership programs are ‘‘arbitrary’’ and
dependent ‘‘upon the values or beliefs of individuals’’ (p. 489).
In the case of supply side programs, a public housing authority supplies subsidized
housing where the price is based on a target x* times the median household income in
the targeted group. In the presence of resource constraints and a public housing budget
that is insufficient to provide subsidies to all eligible applicants, the housing authority
keeps a waiting list of households which have applied for housing benefits. The length
of the waiting list provides an important non-price signal to the housing authority to
increase supply in order to maintain x*. At the same time, in the presence of uncertain
income shocks, the housing authority may not adjust house prices fast enough so that
prevailing xmay be greater or below target x*.
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When the income shock is positive, ratio x < x*, the price difference between the
price set by the housing authority and the market price increases. If y* is set at a fairly
inclusive level, there is an increase in housing demand in the targeted sector; the
waiting list lengthens and this may cause the housing authority to increase housing
starts. When the income shock is negative, and there is no downward adjustment,
the ratio x > x*, the waiting list shortens and the price difference between price set
by the housing authority and the market price falls. This may have the effect of causing
the housing authority to cut back on its building program. However, if the targeted
sector is a small proportion of the population ( y* is a low number), the number of
beneficiaries decrease in good times as incomes rise above the income cut-off point.
Conversely, demand increases in bad times as more households become eligible to benefit
from the program. Housing starts for the targeted sector in this framework respond to
excess demand as reflected in the length of the waiting list, rather than directly to
housing prices. When x is not equal to x*, the length of the waiting list depends on the
income cut-off point as well as on the magnitude of the deviation and this results in
greater volatility in construction activity than the case when x is equal to x*.
Policy decisions with regard to two policy variables, the income cut-off points and
the quality of housing constructed by the housing authority therefore have implications
for market outcomes. Income shocks affect the proportion of the population available
for housing subsidies when absolute income cut-offs points are ‘‘sticky’’. Besides the
price, subsidies per unit are determined by the quality of housing built and sold by the
housing authority and the production (land and construction) costs incurred.
Using the above framework, in the presence of income uncertainty and resource
constraints, the objective of house price affordability is achieved for the targeted
household at the expense of greater volatility in residential construction activity. When
the size of the targeted sector is significant in size, there are spillover price volatility
and crowding out effects on the non-targeted housing market segment. This results in
political pressures on the government to expand the housing affordability target to a
larger proportion of the population.
The methodology applied to study the implications of a homeownership
affordability target on housing market elasticities is the reduced form method used by
Malpezzi and Mayo (1997). It starts with a simple model of demand and supply and
derives a reduced form equation for the equilibrium price. Since both the demand
equation and the supply equation are assumed to be in double-log forms, the estimated
coefficients of the income (Y) and the price (P) term in the demand equation become the
income and price elasticities, 2 and 1, respectively. Likewise, the coefficient of the
price term in the supply equation 1 represents the price elasticity of supply. As it can
be shown below, the price elasticity of supply can be computed from the estimated
coefficient of the equilibrium price equation once the values of the income and price
elasticities of demand are given:
QD ¼ 0 þ 1Ph þ 2Y þ 3D
QS ¼ 0 þ 1Ph
QD ¼ QS
QD is the log quantity of housing demanded, QS is the log quantity of housing supplied,
Ph is the log of the relative price per unit of housing, Y is the log of income and D is the
log of population.
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The reduced form of the system can be found by equating demand and supply and
solving for Ph, the price of housing:
Ph ¼ 0  0 þ 2Y þ 3D
1  11  11  1
Making the reduced form stochastic,
Ph ¼ 0 þ 1Y þ 2D þ "
The price elasticity of housing supply is estimated as
1 ¼ 2
1
þ 1
where 1 is the estimated elasticity of housing price with respect to income, and the
parameters 1, the price elasticity of housing demand and 2, the income elasticity of
demand.
We ask the following question: what are the implications in the above model of a
house price to income ratio target x that is held constant despite changes in income
and population? For a constant quality housing bundle, we obtain
Ph  Y ¼ logðxÞ
Ph ¼ logðxÞ þ Y
Comparing it with the reduced form stochastic,
Ph ¼ 0 þ 1Y þ 2D þ "
we expect a housing market with a house price to income ratio target to exhibit the
following values for 1 and 2 : 1 is equal to one; and 2 is equal to zero.
Since the price elasticity of housing supply is estimated as
1 ¼ 2
1
þ 1
and 1 is equal to one, 1 ¼ 2 þ 1, i.e. the price elasticity of housing supply is equal to
the sum of the price elasticity and the income elasticity of demand for housing. Since both
2 and 1 have been found from empirical studies to be less than one, we expect estimates
of price elasticity of housing supply in price regulated markets to be relatively inelastic.
From the above general theoretical discussion, we extract some hypotheses
concerning a regulated housing market where there exists a homeownership
affordability target that is successfully implemented:
(1) There is crowding out of the non-targeted sector and the size of the targeted
housing sector tends to expand over time.
(2) Housing affordability tends to be fairly constant across income groups and over
time.
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(3) There is greater housing consumption equity than would exist in a
market-oriented housing economy. Given constant house price to income
ratio targets, the income elasticity of demand for housing consumption is
less than one.
(4) New construction of public housing is more sensitive to the length of the waiting
list rather than house prices. Housing supply is relatively price inelastic.
(5) House price changes are less dependent on population growth rates and
construction costs than in a market-oriented housing model.
The above hypotheses regarding the implication of setting a homeownership
affordability target can be subjected to testing in regulated housing markets with such
a target. In the next section, we consider the case for the Singapore housing market.
Singapore as a case study
Singapore is a densely populated high-income city-state with 4.84 million people and a
land area of only 700 km2. Of the 4.84 million people in 2008, 3.16 million were citizens,
0.48 million were permanent residents and 1.20 million were foreigners. Its gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2007 was S$243 billion; the GDP per capita was S$52,994 or
US$35,163 (Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry website at: www.mti.gov.sg).
The Singapore government has a long record of extensive intervention in the
housing sector to ensure homeownership affordability and adequate supply of housing –
a subsidized homeownership scheme was introduced in 1964. As a direct result of
policy interventions and supply of affordable flats, the homeownership rate for resident
Singaporeans exceeds 90 percent. An estimated 86 percent of the resident population
reside in over 900,000 apartments in estates built by the Housing and Development
Board (HDB) – locally referred to as public housing although 95 percent of the units are
owned by their occupants on leasehold basis (a new unit has a leasehold of 99 years).
The median house type in Singapore is the four-room HDB flat which is about 90 m2
(see generally, Phang, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2007).
On the demand side, housing finance availability was supported through the
channeling of compulsory savings to the Central Provident Fund (CPF) for housing down
payments and monthly mortgage payments (see Phang (2001, 2007); Yuen (2002) for
detailed analysis of the mortgage finance system in Singapore). The HDB provides 30-
year mortgages for its homeownership flats, charging an interest rate of 0.1 percent above
the rate paid on CPF savings. The dominance of the state in the housing sector has been
aided by an array of instruments on the supply side. These include land use planning,
land acquisition by the state, government direct provision of housing, government sale of
sites for private housing, as well as density controls and redevelopment regulation.
The state owns about 90 percent of all land today, up from about 44 percent in 1960
(Han, 2005). This dramatic increase in the state’s landholdings was effected via land
reclamation (reclaimed land automatically becomes state land) and most importantly,
eminent domain provisions that made it easy and cheap in the past for the state to
reacquire privately held land for development purposes. State ownership and control of
land were considered essential to building industrial estates to attract multi-national
corporations to invest in Singapore and building public housing on a large scale.
Singapore’s public land leasing system for private housing has played a secondary role
to its public housing program which dominates the housing sector in terms of stock
and annual supply. At present, 80 percent of the housing stock in Singapore has been
developed by the public sector.
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The history of the growth of the public sector dominance is consistent with
hypothesis (i) that there is crowding out of the non-targeted sector and that the size of
the targeted housing sector tends to expand over time. Table I shows various indicators
of growth in the targeted sector, viz., increases in income cut-off points over a 35-year
period from 1970 to 2005, and increasing share of resident population residing in the
HDB sector which peaked at 87 percent in 1985. Table II shows that the variance of the
private housing price index increased significantly from the 1980s to the 1990s. While
other factors also drive house price changes, studies by Phang and Wong (1997), Tu
and Wong (2002) have shown that price changes in the resale HDB and private housing
market were significantly affected by various housing policies.
As another indication of the expansion of the targeted sector, housing schemes for
the group excluded by HDB income cut-offs include:
(1) housing developed by the Housing and Urban Development Company (income
ceiling of $4,000 from 1974 and $6,000 from 1985) which was discontinued in
the later half of the 1980s; and
(2) the Executive Condominiums (EC) Scheme which was initiated in 1997. These are
classified as private housing but with a monthly household income cut-off point of
S$10,000; purchasers face many of the restrictions such as minimum occupancy
period that apply to HDB homeowners. The government tenders state land on 99-
year leasehold basis for the development of EC units to housing developers
(private as well as government-linked companies) who are responsible for design,
construction, pricing, arrangements for financing and estate management.
Table III shows the 2008 house price to income ratio as well as debt service ratios for
different flat sizes sold by the HDB. In addition to the subsidized price, since 2006,
eligible households are entitled to additional housing grants which are based on
household incomes. This lowers housing price to income ratios further for the lower
income groups. As shown in Table III, the house price to income ratio increases with
flat size and is 4.6 and below for the majority of applicants (four room and smaller
Year
Income ceiling
cut-off for HDB
homeownership flats
% of resident
population residing
in HDB sector
Homeownership
rate for resident
households (%)
1970 $1,200 (1970) 35 29
1980 $2,500 (1979) 81 59
1990 $5,000 (1989) 86 88
2000 $8,000 (1994) 83 92
2005 $8,000 (1994) 82 91
Source: HDB Annual Reports (various years)
Table I.
Expansion of targeted
sectors for eligibility of
housing subsidy
Decade Variance
1979-1988 122
1989-1998 2,200
1999-2008 395
Table II.
Variance in private
housing price index
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flats). The debt-service ratio (DSR) is fairly constant across flat types (18-24 percent)
and averages 21 percent, evidence that housing prices are determined based on
incomes of the targeted groups and housing expenditure to income is fairly constant
across the targeted income groups.
According to the Minister for National Development, ‘‘We monitor affordability by
how much a flat buyer has to pay out of his monthly household income to service his
mortgage payments. . . . The DSR for almost all flat types was lower than 23 percent.
Why 23 percent? Because 23 percent is the monthly CPF contribution that can be used
for housing mortgages. This means that the loan can be serviced entirely by their
monthly CPF contributions. In other words, they need not fork out any cash to own
their homes’’ (Mah, 2009, paragraphs 5 and 6).
Table IV shows the variation in house price to income ratio over the past decade for
a new HDB 4-room flat and using the median household income from work for resident
HDB flat
type
Average
price*
Flat size in
square metresþ
Average
price
per sq m
Median
income of
applicants*
House price
to income
ratio#
Debt-service
ratio* (%)
2-room $88,000 45 $1,956 $1,280 5.7 (3.1) 18
3-room $146,000 65 $2,246 $2,100 5.8 (4.6) 24
4-room $251,000 90 $2,789 $4,350 4.8 (4.6) 21
5-room $339,000 110 $3,082 $5,400 5.2 23
Average 21
Note: #The house price to income ratios in brackets take into account the Additional CPF
Housing Grants which varies with household incomes. We assume the grant to be S$40,000 for
two-room flat applicants, S$30,000 for three-room flat applicants and S$10,000 for four-room flat
applicants
Sources: þHDB Annual Report; *figures from Mah (2009)
Table III.
House price to income
and debt-service ratios
(DSR), 2008
Year
Price of four
room HDB flata
Monthly household
incomeb
House price
to income ratio
1995 $135,830 $3,135 3.6
1997 $173,548 $3,617 4.0
1998 $182,450 $3,692 4.1
1999 $179,945 $3,500 4.3
2000 $176,100 $3,640 4.0
2001 $175,463 $3,860 3.8
2002 $167,511 $3,630 3.8
2003 $169,476 $3,600 3.9
2004 $177,790 $3,690 4.0
2005 $187,860 $3,860 4.1
2006 $215,643 $4,000 4.5
2007 $214,016 $4,380 4.1
2008 $251,000 $4,950 4.2
Notes: aBased on author’s hedonic housing price regression estimation with flat type and location
dummies using price data for new flats from HDB Annual Reports; brefers to monthly median
household income from work for resident households; data for 1996 income is not available
Source: Income data from Singapore Department of Statistics (2009), Key Household Income
Trends 2008, January 2009
Table IV.
Estimated house price to
income ratio for four-
room flat purchased
directly from the HDB
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households. The ratio shows a marked increase in the latter half of the 1990s with
prices adjusting upwards with the housing boom and with increases being maintained
during the post-Asian financial crisis period which saw significant market price
declines (see Figure 1). The ratio was fairly stable in the economic recovery period
2000-2005 and ranged from 3.8 to 4.1. In 2006, as the housing market recovered, there
were increases in new flat prices even as a new system of additional housing grants
(ranging from S$5,000 to S$20,000 per eligible household) that were based on
household income were introduced.
Figure 1 shows trends for GDP per capita and three house price indices for
Singapore: new HDB, resale HDB and private housing. To simplify comparison, the
indices have been adjusted such that they all have a value of 100 in 1993. It is apparent
that the HDB chose not to follow market trends and adjust new flat prices downwards
in line with income falls in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. This caused new
HDB flats to be less affordable – the number of applicants for new flats fell to 22,000 in
June 2001 from its peak of 146,000 in 1997. Many households dropped out of the queue
and the HDB was left with a surplus stock of about 20,000 unsold flats in the late 1990s
(The Straits Times, 15 September 2001, 10 January 2002 and 20 September 2009).
However, the policy to maintain new flat prices, which resulted in the large stock of
unsold units which was cleared only in 2007, helped mitigate house price declines (The
Straits Times, 20 September 2009). In 2002, the HDB suspended its queuing system,
diverting remaining and new applicants to its project specific Built-to-Order program
under which a project is commenced only when there is sufficient demand for units.
Table V shows the housing space consumption differences in Singapore as
compared to the income gap. There is greater housing consumption equity than would
exist in a market-oriented housing economy. While the ratio of median household
income of applicants for five-room flats to three-room flats is 2.57, the ratio of living
space is 1.69. Based on the limited data on flat size and median household income data
Figure 1.
Trends for nominal per
capita income and
housing price indices
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in Table V, rough estimates of income elasticity of housing demand are less than one
and these are consistent with estimates for other countries. Although household data
would have provided more rigorous and precise estimates, the data are unavailable.
The increasing average price per sq m for larger flat types (from $1,956 to $3,082 per
square meter for similar housing type) is an indication that the administered price of
each flat type is based on factors other than development costs. The HDB has clarified
that it determines the prices of its flats by ‘‘first looking at the recently transacted
prices of resale units nearby. Adjustments are then made to account for factors like
location, finishes of the flat and other attributes. The price reflects the flat’s value at the
point of purchase and is what people are willing to pay on the open market for such a
unit. The HDB then sells it at a significant discount, which is the subsidy given by the
Government’’ (The Straits Times, 20 September 2009, p.8).
The HDB tracks the number of applications for its housing programs closely and its
building program is responsive to demand (as stated by the Minister for National
Development, The Straits Times, 15 September 2009). We would therefore expect
supply of public housing to be relatively price inelastic. Table VI shows the price
elasticity of supply estimates using the Malpezzi-Mayo reduced form estimation
method for the resale HDB price series and the private housing price series. The income
coefficient for the HDB sector, where affordability is tracked closely, is close to one.
HDB flat type
Flat size
in sq m
Average price
per sq m
Median monthly
household income of applicants
2-room 45 $1,956 $1,280
3-room 65 $2,246 $2,100
4-room 90 $2,789 $4,350
5-room 110 $3,082 $5,400
5 to 3-rm ratio 1.69 1.37 2.57
5 to 2-rm ratio 2.44 1.58 4.22
Source: As for Table III
Table V.
Housing space
consumption gaps
versus income gap 2008
Estimates of price elasticity
of housing supply 1
1¼2/1 þ 1
Price series Income Population Income elasticity 2
coefficient 1 coefficient 2 ¼ 0.5 2 ¼ 0.75
Resale HDB
1990-2008 annual 0.00 (1¼0.5) 0.25 (1¼0.5)
R2 ¼ 0.625 0.9985 (1.14) 0.8446 (0.67) 0.20 (1¼0.3) 0.45 (1¼0.3)
Private housing
1975-2008 annual 0.23 (1 ¼ 0.5) 0.09 (1 ¼ 0.5)
R2 ¼ 0.880 1.8183 (4.58) 1.1749 (1.46) 0.03 (1 ¼ 0.3) 0.11 (1¼0.3)
Notes: 1. Income series used is nominal per capita GDP, price series are nominal as well;
2. Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates denote t-statistics
Table VI.
Estimates of price
elasticity of housing
supply
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From the literature on housing elasticites (Malpezzi and Mayo, 1987; Malpezzi and
Maclennan, 2001), we assume the range of income elasticity of housing demand to
be between 0.50 and 0.75, and price elasticity of housing demand to be between 0.3
and 0.5. Based on these values, reasonable estimates of price elasticity of supply for
the HDB sector lie in the 0-0.45 range; for the private housing sector (converting
negative values to zero) the range of estimates lies between 0 and 0.11.
As expected, the coefficient of the population coefficient is not significant for both
resale HDB and private housing. This is consistent with hypothesis (v) concerning
housing systems with homeownership affordability targets. In a study of Singapore’s
private housing market, Tu (2004) found that building material cost indexes and prime
lending rates were also not significant variables in the supply model. She suggested
that the ‘‘building material cost indexes reflect the building material costs for both
public and private housing construction. Importing low-cost building materials has
been the method used by Singapore’s public housing provider to control the
construction costs of public housing. Hence, the building material cost indexes are not
an adequate indicator for the cost of private housing construction’’ (Tu, 2004, p. 617).
An alternative explanation offered here is that in a housing model with a targeted
homeownership affordability ratio, housing prices and construction activity are policy
driven and determined by other variables rather than costs.
Conclusion
There is a large literature on affordable housing and housing policy. This paper adds to
the literature by analyzing the implications of setting homeownership affordability
targets in the context of a targeted housing segment. The analyzes suggest a number of
market implications of such regulation as compared to a market-oriented housing
model. These include expansion of the targeted housing sector over time, the relative
constancy of actual housing price to income ratios for households in the targeted sector,
greater housing space consumption equity, income inelastic housing demand, price
inelastic housing supply as well as house price changes that are relatively less driven
by population growth rates and construction costs.
While the experience and data for Singapore were found to support the above
hypotheses, it is neither possible nor desirable to make generalizations based on
Singapore’s rather unique housing experience. The expansion of the targeted housing
sector requires appropriate political and financial support. This political support and
appropriate financial regime that facilitated expansion in resources to the program are
evident in Singapore and reflect the specific evolution of its housing policy.
Similar homeownership policies have been designed and followed by countries
which have emphasized housing welfare and explicitly aim for increased
homeownership rates such as Norway, Hong Kong, South Korea and the UK. A
targeted affordable housing policy, adopted under different fiscal and monetary
constraints, would not necessarily have outcomes similar to Singapore. How the
experiences of these countries relate to the findings presented here constitute potential
areas for further comparative research.
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